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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This suit for sums past due for transportation of cargo 
emerges from a setting of contractual relationships and 
prior litigation history so complicated and convoluted as to 
almost boggle the mind. It will take over thirteen pages of 
typescript to describe them. The case had its genesis in a 
now-failed Australian corporation's relationship with a still- 
extant Hong Kong corporation. The plaintiffs here claim to 
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have been victims of fraud by the Hong Kong corporation. 
Aspects of the controversy have previously been litigated in 
an Australian liquidation proceeding, a New Jersey 
bankruptcy proceeding (consolidated with a California 
proceeding),1 and a civil action in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The present 
appeal arises from an order of the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs 
Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. ("Southern Cross") 
and Transport International Pool Inc. ("TIP") against 
defendant Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd. ("Wah Kwong") 
under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the 
statute of limitations barred the action. It presents two 
interesting and important questions, one of which we 
resolve in a way that creates a circuit split. 
 
The first issue stems from the defense that the District 
Court lacked diversity jurisdiction because the defendant is 
a Hong Kong corporation. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit has determined that Hong Kong 
corporations, being neither "citizens" nor"subjects" of a 
foreign state, were "stateless" and therefore do not fall 
within federal alienage diversity jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1332(a)(2). See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 
F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 883 (1998). 
We disagree. 
 
Because the question implicates foreign policy, we 
requested that the government offer its views, and we now 
endorse the State Department's position that a Hong Kong 
corporation, though not a "citizen" of the United Kingdom, 
was a "subject" of the United Kingdom for purposes of 
diversity jurisdiction. At the time the lawsuit wasfiled, 
Hong Kong was a British Dependent Territory. While 
governed by laws separate from those governing the United 
Kingdom itself, Hong Kong was ultimately subject to British 
sovereignty. The British Crown had the power of final 
approval of its laws. Furthermore, under the relevant 
consular agreements, Hong Kong citizens (including 
corporations) were treated as United Kingdom "nationals" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The principal asset in both the Australian liquidation and the U.S. 
bankruptcy came from the proceeds of a California arbitration. 
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for purposes of relations between the United Kingdom and 
the United States. Therefore, we agree with the District 
Court that we possess subject matter jurisdiction. 
 
The second issue implicates the permissible scope of a 
court's inquiry on a 12(b)(6) motion. The plaintiffs filed their 
complaint in December 1996. The District Court granted 
the defendant's 12(b)(6) motion, which was grounded on the 
statute of limitations, because the fraudulent acts 
complained of occurred in the mid-1980s and the court was 
satisfied that New Jersey's six-year statute of limitations for 
fraud had long since run. The plaintiffs, however, maintain 
that the facts that might have given them knowledge of a 
probable cause of action did not come to their attention 
until 1992 and that they could not reasonably have been 
expected to know them sooner. 
 
Resolution of the issue requires us to examine the 
published opinion in the earlier New Jersey bankruptcy 
litigation. Although this examination takes us beyond the 
face of the complaint, we conclude that we may take 
judicial notice of that opinion as a matter of public record 
and as a document on which the plaintiffs rely in the 
complaint. We further conclude that, as a matter of law, the 
opinion provided the bankruptcy creditors in that action 
with notice of the facts that should have led them to inquire 
into the alleged fraud. Because the plaintiffs were creditors 
who filed claims in that action, they should have known of 
the opinion. Therefore, we will affirm the District Court's 
conclusion that the complaint is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
 
As is already apparent, the factual and procedural 
background of this case is incredibly complex. Because the 
subject matter jurisdiction issue is a threshold matter that 
is distinct from the other issues before us, we address it 
first, and then turn to the facts and procedural history. 
 
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
Wah Kwong alleges that we lack alienage diversity 
jurisdiction in this case because, as a corporation organized 
under Hong Kong law, it is "stateless" and does not fall 
within 28 U.S.C. S 1332(a)(2). The Supreme Court has 
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recently instructed us not to hypothesize jurisdiction, but 
to decide jurisdiction first and then address other issues 
only if there is jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). Thus, we address 
this issue before resolving the parties' other arguments. 
 
Section 1332(a)(2) confers original jurisdiction on federal 
courts in civil actions in which the matter in controversy 
exceeds $75,000 between "citizens of a State and citizens or 
subjects of a foreign state." This tracks the language of 
Article III of the Constitution, which extends the federal 
judicial power to "all Cases . . . between a State, or Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." Wah 
Kwong argues that, as a Hong Kong corporation, it is 
neither a citizen nor a subject of a "foreign state."2 The 
District Court found that it had jurisdiction, reasoning only 
that federal jurisdiction in this case served the interests of 
"providing a neutral forum and avoiding the appearance of 
injustice or creating grounds for resentment in the relations 
of the United States with other nations." Slip Op. at 14. 
 
A. The Second Circuit's View 
 
The District Court's decision is in conflict with the 
Second Circuit's decision in Matimak. The District Court 
disposed of the jurisdictional issue summarily, and did not 
discuss Matimak. In Matimak, Judge McLaughlin, joined by 
Judge Jacobs, held that Hong Kong was not a "foreign 
state" for purposes of alienage jurisdiction and that Hong 
Kong corporations were not "citizens or subjects" of the 
United Kingdom. Matimak set forth two important 
principles that formed the basis for its decision. 
 
The first concerned the definition of "foreign state": 
 
       Neither the Constitution nor S 1332(a)(2) defines 
       "foreign state." However, "it has generally been held 
       that a foreign state is one formally recognized by the 
       executive branch of the United States government." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Diversity is to be determined at the time the complaint is filed. See 
Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957). Hong Kong was a British 
Dependent Territory at the time the complaint wasfiled, and it so 
remained until July 1, 1997, when sovereignty was transferred to the 
People's Republic of China. 
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       13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice 
       & Procedure S 3604 (1984). 
 
Matimak, 118 F.3d at 79. It is undisputed that Hong Kong 
has not been formally recognized as an independent 
sovereign by the executive branch. The Matimak court also 
found that Hong Kong was not a "de facto" foreign state, 
despite its status as the United States's twelfth-largest 
trading partner and the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act 
of 1992, 22 U.S.C.A. SS 5701-5732 (West Supp. 1996). That 
Act establishes that Congress desires close United States- 
Hong Kong relations to continue after Hong Kong's change 
from a British Dependent Territory to a special 
administrative region of the People's Republic of China.3 
While the Act demonstrates that there is a special, close 
relationship between the United States and Hong Kong, 
that, we agree, is simply not the same as explicit 
recognition of foreign statehood. 
 
Recognition matters because the Framers feared that 
foreign nations might become incensed if they perceived 
that state courts were biased against foreigners; the result 
could be or commercial disruption if foreign nations became 
incensed at the treatment of their citizens or subjects in 
state courts. See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 82-83. Matimak 
suggested that, "[w]here the Executive Branch determines 
that a foreign entity is not a `sovereign,' there is no threat 
of entanglement with a sovereign stemming from the refusal 
of a federal court to treat that entity's citizen in a national 
forum." Id. at 83. The court recognized that, if an 
unrecognized foreign entity perceived that its citizens had 
been subject to bias in a state court, there could be foreign 
relations repercussions, but found that it was for the 
executive branch to evaluate a foreign entity's autonomy 
and resources in order to determine whether the entity 
constituted a sovereign state. Thus, the risk of foreign 
policy entanglements was not for the court to evaluate. See 
id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Act provides that "Hong Kong plays an important role in today's 
regional and world economy. This role is reflected in strong economic, 
cultural, and other ties with the United States that give the United 
States a strong interest in the continued vitality, prosperity, and 
stability 
of Hong Kong." 22 U.S.C. S 5701(4). 
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The second crucial principle in Matimak concerned the 
definition of "citizens or subjects," and a corollary relating 
to corporations: 
 
       We begin with the truism that a foreign state is entitled 
       to define who are its citizens or subjects. United States 
       v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 668, 18 S.Ct. 456, 
       464, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898) ("Nor can it be doubted that 
       it is the inherent right of every independent nation to 
       determine for itself, and according to its own 
       constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be 
       entitled to its citizenship."); Ruggiero v. Compania 
       Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui", 639 F.2d 
       872, 875 (2d Cir. 1981); Murarka v. Bachrack Bros. 
       Inc., 215 F.2d 547, 551-53 (2d Cir. 1954); 13B C. 
       Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and 
       Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d SS 3604 & 3611 (1984). 
 
        It is another accepted precept that a corporation, for 
       purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is a "citizen" or 
       "subject" of the entity under whose sovereignty it is 
       created. 
 
Id. at 85. 
 
The court concluded that Hong Kong corporations were 
not "citizens or subjects" of the United Kingdom because 
the United Kingdom did not recognize such corporations as 
citizens. The British Nationality Act 1981, which extends 
privileges to natural persons in British Dependent 
Territories such as Hong Kong, does not apply to 
corporations. The British Companies Act 1948 specifies 
that corporations formed under the laws of Hong Kong are 
not entitled to the privileges of British nationality. See 
Matimak, 118 F.3d at 85. Given these laws, the court 
concluded that the alternate argument that Hong Kong 
corporations were ultimately subject to British sovereignty 
must also be rejected, reasoning that "Hong Kong 
corporations . . . are no more `subjects' than `citizens.' " Id. 
at 86. Although Hong Kong's laws might ultimately be 
traceable to the British Crown, the Matimak court reasoned 
that Hong Kong corporations were in fact incorporated 
under the Companies Ordinance 1984 of Hong Kong and 
entitled only to the protection of that law. See id. 
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Judge Altimari dissented, arguing that "[a] stateless 
corporation is an oxymoron." Id. at 89 (Altimari, J., 
dissenting). He emphasized the practical importance of 
Hong Kong-United States relations and the State 
Department's expressed view that Hong Kong corporations 
should be allowed to take advantage of alienage 
jurisdiction. He would have found diversity jurisdiction over 
a Hong Kong corporation on any of three grounds: (1) as a 
citizen or subject of a "de facto" autonomous state; (2) as a 
citizen or subject of the United Kingdom, given the 
"inexorabl[e] link[age]" between Hong Kong and the United 
Kingdom; or (3) as a citizen or subject of a "political 
subdivision" of the United Kingdom. See id. at 91-92 
(Altimari, J., dissenting). 
 
B. The Purposes of Alienage Jurisdiction 
 
Most courts have accepted the proposition that the 
problem of "statelessness" was unanticipated by the 
Framers, because it is a twentieth-century phenomenon. 
"[A] basic assumption of the drafters was that anyone who 
was not a citizen of the United States must by definition 
have been subject to the power of a foreign government or 
sovereign." Matimak, 118 F.3d at 87. Thus, the Framers 
apparently considered the class of "subjects or citizens of a 
foreign state" as identical with the class of"aliens." See 
Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical 
Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal 
Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 Yale J. 
Int'l L. 1, 1-20 (1996). 
 
Historical evidence from the Federalist Papers  and the 
debates over the ratification of the Constitution shows that 
the Framers often "refer[red] to citizens, subjects and 
foreigners interchangeably." Van der Schelling v. U.S. News 
& World Report, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 756, 759 (E.D. Pa.), 
aff'd, 324 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1963) (per curiam). In fact, the 
phrase "citizens or subjects" reflected an expansive intent: 
 
       The framers of the Constitution were undoubtedly 
       keenly aware of the fact that they had lately been 
       subjects and that in other lands men still remained 
       subjects of a sovereign and not citizens of a state.. . . 
       It was only by the inclusion of `subjects' that all aliens, 
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       whether they [owed] allegiance to a sovereign monarch 
       or were citizens of a democracy, could sue or be sued 
       in federal courts. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        . . . . Indeed, Story's doubts appear to have been 
       abandoned, for in his `Commentaries on the 
       Constitution of the United States' (5th Ed., 1891) he 
       says, at page 499: 
 
        `* * * The inquiry may here be made, who are to be 
       deemed aliens entitled to sue in the courts of the 
       United States? The general answer is, any person who 
       is not a citizen of the United States. * * *' 
 
Id. at 761 (emphasis added). Thus, while foreign modes of 
government are hardly "technicalities" in any other sense, 
the Framers apparently did not consider them relevant to 
the exercise of federal jurisdiction. See Johnson, supra; 
Bradford Williams, Note, The Aftermath of Matimak Trading 
Co. v. Khalily: Is the American Legal System Ready for 
Global Interdependence?, 23 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 
201, 224-25 (1997); cf. Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 
916 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the 
"policies supporting alienage jurisdiction" supported 
jurisdiction over a Cayman Islands citizen--the Cayman 
Islands is also a British Dependent Territory). 
 
Matimak rejected these and similar statements on the 
ground that the Framers never contemplated 
"statelessness." See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 87. However, 
without further analysis, this is an inadequate response. 
The Framers never contemplated telephones, and yet we 
have applied the Fourth Amendment to cases about 
telephones. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
(overruling an earlier decision that had held that 
telephones, not having been within the Framers' 
contemplation, would not receive Fourth Amendment 
protection). The relevant question is whether the Framers 
articulated principles that assist us in this case. 
 
We believe that they did. The history reviewed in Van der 
Schelling is relevant because Hong Kong's importance to the 
United States evokes the Framers' concerns for smooth 
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foreign relations. As two practitioners note, British 
Dependent Territories "are the international equivalent of 
Delaware or Nevada for many clients." William Wilson III & 
Jonathan K. Cooperman, 2d Circuit Bars Suits by 
"Offshore" Corporations, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at B9. 
Because Hong Kong was a dependent territory of the United 
Kingdom and is now a special administrative region of the 
Peoples' Republic of China, the way we treat its 
corporations may affect our relations with those countries, 
not to mention our relations with Hong Kong itself. See 
Wilson, 916 F.2d at 1243 (exercise of American judicial 
authority over a citizen of a British Dependent Territory 
implicates our relations with the United Kingdom). The 
State Department expressed this concern in its submission 
to us. 
 
C. Who is a "Subject" of a Foreign State? 
 
1. The State Department's Position 
 
The State Department's view, communicated to us by the 
Justice Department at our request, is that: 
 
       [I]n the last analysis, Hong Kong nationals, including 
       corporations, [were] subjects of United Kingdom 
       sovereignty. While the United States views Hong Kong 
       as largely autonomous in most respects, as a matter of 
       recognition, it deal[t] with Hong Kong through British 
       authorities, since Hong Kong [was] ultimately subject 
       to United Kingdom sovereignty. The various 
       international agreements between Hong Kong and the 
       United States [were] identified in the State 
       Department's authoritative "Treaties In Force" under 
       "United Kingdom" sovereignty. The Consular 
       Convention between the United States and the United 
       Kingdom identifie[d] citizens of the United Kingdom's 
       "colonies" (including corporations) as U.K."nationals" 
       for purposes of relations between the two countries. 
       This approach [was] mirrored in the underlying legal 
       structure under which [a Hong Kong] corporation was 
       created. The Letters Patent for Hong Kong issued by 
       the British Crown [made] clear that ultimate 
       sovereignty and authority, including final approval of 
       all laws, [was] reserved to the British Crown. Since the 
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       ultimate sovereign authority over [a Hong Kong 
       corporation was] the British Crown, [it] should be 
       treated as a subject of United Kingdom sovereignty for 
       purposes of alienage diversity jurisdiction. 
 
Gov't Brief at 6-7.4 
 
2. Citizens and Subjects 
 
Matimak rejected the State Department's argument, 
which was identical to the argument presented to us, on 
the ground that Hong Kong corporations were not United 
Kingdom citizens according to explicit United Kingdom law. 
If they were not citizens, Matimak reasoned, they could not 
be subjects. We agree with Matimak that, in general, there 
is no difference between the way our federal courts deal 
with "citizens" and "subjects": 
 
       In S 1332(a)(2) the terms "citizen" and"subject" do not 
       connote a different "degree of attachment or allegiance 
       to a foreign state." 1 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's 
       Federal Practice P 0.75 (3d ed. 1996); United States v. 
       Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 663-664, 42 L. Ed. 890, 
       18 S. Ct. 456 (1898) ("The term `citizen,' as understood 
       in our law, is precisely analogous to the term `subject' 
       in the common law, and the change of phrase has 
       entirely resulted from the change of government."). 
       Rather, the terms are meant to encompass persons 
       living under distinct forms of government: "A monarchy 
       has subjects; a republic has citizens." Moore, supra, 
       P 0.75. 
 
Matimak, 118 F.3d at 85. 
 
The two terms are identical in that they both describe a 
relationship between an individual and a sovereign power 
that suffices to confer alienage jurisdiction on a federal 
court. That the terms are identical for this specific purpose, 
however, does not mean that a sovereign must have only 
"citizens" or only "subjects." See Walter C. Hutchens, Note, 
Alienage Jurisdiction and the Problem of Stateless 
Corporations, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 1067, 1081 n.81 (1998). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. At the time the brief was written, Hong Kong remained a British 
Dependent Territory. 
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British law does not clearly establish that the British Crown 
recognizes only one sort of sovereign relationship. Rather, 
British law, while silent on the crucial issue here, seems to 
recognize both "citizens" and "subjects." The United 
Kingdom has by statute made natural persons who are 
citizens of Hong Kong or other British colonies subjects of 
the Crown. See British Nationality Act 1948, at 1. Hong 
Kong corporations are not covered by this statute, but the 
State Department's position is that Hong Kong's laws 
required Crown approval at the relevant time, and its 
conclusion that Hong Kong corporations were thus 
ultimately subject to United Kingdom sovereignty seems 
eminently reasonable. We are concerned that, were we to 
decide that a foreign sovereign must choose between having 
"citizens" and "subjects," we would be making a fairly 
significant foreign policy decision, and one that the State 
Department rejects. 
 
3. The Role of Deference to the Executive Branch 
 
We accord substantial weight to the State Department's 
position. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398 (1964), the Supreme Court considered the right of an 
instrumentality of a hostile foreign government to file suit 
in U.S. courts. The United States had severed formal 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, but had not derecognized it 
as a sovereign. The Court rejected the argument that a 
hostile government should not be allowed to litigate in U.S. 
courts. Sabbatino looked to the executive's position in 
support of its decision: 
 
       The view that the existing situation between the United 
       States and Cuba should not lead to a denial of status 
       to sue is buttressed by the circumstance that none of 
       the acts of our Government have been aimed at closing 
       the courts of this country to Cuba, and more 
       particularly by the fact that the Government has come 
       to the support of Cuba's "act of state" claim in this very 
       litigation. 
 
Id. at 411.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We also note that Taiwanese citizens have been allowed to sue under 
alienage jurisdiction, despite formal derecognition of Taiwan by the 
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We will likewise take heed of the State Department's 
position here. We do not believe that executive authority in 
foreign policy matters is limited to the definition of "foreign 
state" for S 1332 purposes. Executive competence also 
extends to the definition of "citizens or subjects," at a 
minimum in cases where the proper interpretation is 
unclear and the outcome may affect our foreign policy. Just 
as the executive is best positioned to make the 
determination that recognition of a sovereign is appropriate, 
the executive is best situated to conclude that Hong Kong 
was, at the time suit was filed, so closely connected to the 
United Kingdom that its corporations were United Kingdom 
subjects. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In summary, it is established that Hong Kong 
corporations were not United Kingdom citizens at the time 
the lawsuit was filed, but it is quite plausible that they were 
United Kingdom subjects. The law of the United Kingdom is 
not entirely clear on this point. The State Department, 
however, has informed us that, consistent with various 
agreements with Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, it 
considers Hong Kong corporations to have been subjects of 
the United Kingdom for alienage diversity purposes. This, it 
represents, best reflects the actual relationship between the 
United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and the United States. There 
is no indication that the United Kingdom disagrees with 
this characterization. For the reasons set forth above, we 
agree with the State Department that treating Hong Kong 
corporations as United Kingdom subjects comports with the 
facts and the law of alienage jurisdiction. We therefore have 
jurisdiction of this case under 28 U.S.C. S 1332(a)(2). 
 
II. Facts and Procedural History 
 
As we noted at the outset, this case has a history that is 
difficult to follow. We attempt to unravel the tangled 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
executive branch. See, e.g., Chang v. Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 506 F. 
Supp. 975 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Formal derecognition had geopolitical causes 
and consequences far overwhelming diversity jurisdiction, yet courts 
have not found that derecognition indicated a desire on the part of the 
executive branch to strip Taiwanese citizens of the benefits of alienage 
diversity jurisdiction. 
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narrative by describing the dramatis personae, the essence 
of the plaintiffs' claims, and then the tortuous course of 
events that brought the parties to this court. 
 
A. Parties 
 
The plaintiffs are Southern Cross and TIP. Southern 
Cross, a New Jersey corporation that acted as a booking 
agent for corporations that transport ocean marine cargo, is 
wholly owned by a corporation that in turn is at least forty 
percent owned by Trygve Vangsnes, a Norwegian national.6 
TIP is a Pennsylvania corporation that rents equipment to 
corporations that transport such cargo. The defendant is 
Wah Kwong Shipping Group, Ltd. ("Wah Kwong"), a 
corporation organized under Hong Kong law. Wah Kwong is 
the parent holding company of a group of subsidiary 
companies, including Maritime Shipping & Investments, 
Ltd. ("MSI") and Venture Shipping Managers, Ltd. ("VSM"). 
Hong Kong residents Frank and George Chao were the chief 
executives and managers of Wah Kwong and various 
subsidiaries. 
 
Other entities are also involved in this case. Karlander 
(Australia) Pty. Ltd. ("Karlander") was an Australian 
company operating an ocean liner service out of Australia. 
Until 1983, Karlander chartered five vessels from 
shipowning companies in which MSI owned shares, at 
which time Karlander went into arrears. Karlander was 
reorganized and the liner service was separately 
incorporated as KKL Kangaroo Lines ("KKL"). Vangsnes was 
owner and chief executive officer of KKL. Southern Cross 
and TIP provided services to KKL, which called on ports in 
New Jersey before it ceased doing business in 1986. At that 
time, KKL allegedly owed money to Southern Cross and TIP. 
 
B. Pre-litigation Activity 
 
The plaintiffs' claims spring from a series of agreements 
between Wah Kwong or its subsidiaries and KKL. The 
agreements apparently involved a $6 million loan from Wah 
Kwong that enabled KKL to continue in business. However, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Southern Cross apparently filed a Chapter 11 petition in 1986, which 
was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court in 1994. Accordingly, it may 
lack present existence, although the parties do not discuss the issue. 
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the plaintiffs argue that the agreements actually 
established a partnership relationship between Wah Kwong 
and KKL's other principal (Vansgnes). 
 
In particular, the plaintiffs argue that convoluted 
agreements, subagreements, collateral agreements--many 
of which cancelled prior agreements--addenda, and side 
letters were used to construct KKL. Thus, while Wah Kwong 
ostensibly made a loan to start KKL, backed by a demand 
note and stating an interest rate, the plaintiffs submit that 
in fact this "loan" was for show and did not reflect the true 
equity relationship between the parties. The plaintiffs allege 
that Wah Kwong was entitled to receive and retain KKL's 
profits over $100,000 and that the $6 million was the cost 
of buying into KKL's business. Moreover, the $6 million 
went back to Wah Kwong via intermediaries immediately 
after the "loan" was made. 
 
The basic substance of the written agreements was as 
follows: Karlander chartered vessels from shipowning 
companies in which MSI and VSM had interests. The 
payments ("charterhire") accumulated and became overdue. 
Karlander's owners decided to restructure the company by 
forming KKL to operate Karlander's Australian-U.S. liner 
service; KKL undertook Karlander's charters with the 
shipowning companies and assumed outstanding 
charterhire. At about the same time, Wah Kwong sought 
advice from its accountants at Price Waterhouse, who 
suggested five ways Wah Kwong might respond to the 
restructuring and the unpaid charterhire, including the 
injection of $6 million as a loan to KKL. In March 1983, 
Wah Kwong and Karlander entered into a "Loan Facility" 
under which MSI would provide up to $6 million to 
Karlander to pay off overdue charterhire. 
 
On November 26, 1983, Karlander, KKL and Wah Kwong 
executed a document called the Heads of Agreement. This 
document provided that English law would govern its 
interpretation. Vangsnes and Frank Chao signed for all 
parties, including various holding companies controlled by 
Wah Kwong and others controlled by Vangsnes. Southern 
Cross was one of those companies, though Southern 
Cross's CEO has submitted an affidavit that Vangsnes was 
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never authorized to sign documents on behalf of Southern 
Cross. 
 
Noting that Karlander was indebted to Wah Kwong and 
 839<!>that Karlander's successor, KKL, required financial 
 
assistance to pay off Karlander's creditors, the Heads of 
Agreement provided that MSI would make a $6 million 
interest-free deposit, repayable on demand, with afinance 
company established as a wholly-owned subsidiary of KKL. 
The finance company then would advance the deposit to 
KKL, which would advance the money to Karlander to pay 
off the outstanding charterhire. As security for the $6 
million deposit, KKL granted MSI an option to acquire half 
of KKL's stock. (KKL's main asset at that point was its 
rights in an arbitration proceeding between Karlander and 
the Weyerhauser company.) 
 
The Heads of Agreement also authorized MSI to appoint 
two members of KKL's board of directors, at least one of 
whom was required for a quorum; to appoint a financial 
consultant to KKL; and to approve KKL's auditors. The 
agreement additionally allowed MSI to appoint two 
members of the boards of directors of the holding 
companies, including Southern Cross. 
 
The Heads of Agreement stated that it would not become 
effective until additional documents were executed. One 
such document, a side letter signed the same day as the 
Heads of Agreement, noted that repayment of the $6 million 
deposit "is by mutual agreement instead of on demand." 
Another document, the Supplemental Agreement, 
warranted that KKL's total outstanding debts were not more 
than $10.6 million, and stated that if that representation 
were false, MSI would be entitled to demand repayment of 
the $6 million. The Supplemental Agreement also 
established a two-person committee, including one MSI 
nominee, to monitor KKL's cash flow and recommend 
guidelines for payments to creditors. 
 
In accordance with the Heads of Agreement and the 
related agreements, on February 6, 1984, VSM drew a $6 
million check on MSI's account payable to KKL's 
subsidiary. The subsidiary endorsed the check to KKL, 
which endorsed it to VSM as the shipowners' agent in 
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payment of outstanding charterhire. Thus, the loan 
proceeds returned to Wah Kwong-controlled companies. On 
February 22, 1984, George Chao sent Vangsnes a notice of 
default indicating that KKL's total outstanding debts in fact 
exceeded $10.6 million. On March 2, 1984, the parties 
executed a document providing for the assignment of KKL's 
and Karlander's ship-operation earnings to VSM as 
"security for the various obligations" to MSI and VSM. The 
agreement provided that KKL's earnings would be paid to 
VSM-designated bank accounts, though such earnings first 
would be applied to charterhire due to shipowners. Wah 
Kwong represents that the Assignment of Earnings was 
never implemented. 
 
In April 1984, the parties agreed that the finance 
committee provided for in the Supplemental Agreement 
would be replaced by an arrangement in which the Wah 
Kwong-nominated members of the KKL board would 
examine KKL's various expenditures. In August 1984, 
Vangsnes agreed that all KKL checks would be signed 
jointly by Wah Kwong and KKL representatives. The 
plaintiffs assert that Wah Kwong took further steps to 
ensure its control of KKL's expenses, including entering 
into agreements with two principal booking agents in the 
U.S., Great Lakes Overseas, Inc. ("GLO") in the midwest 
and Southern Cross in New Jersey, to arrange for booking 
services and provide customers to KKL. Wah Kwong also 
sent two employees to New Jersey and stationed them on 
Southern Cross's premises to ensure that only properly 
approved expenses would be paid in the U.S.; these 
employees remained in New Jersey for almost two years. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that Wah Kwong's representatives 
essentially raided KKL, paying sums owed to Wah Kwong 
subsidiaries ahead of the priority actually allowed to them 
under the various agreements. It was this activity, 
according to the plaintiffs, that led to KKL's liquidation. At 
the time KKL stopped doing business in January 1986, it 
still carried the $6 million to Wah Kwong on its books as a 
debt, along with other accumulated arrearages, including 
debts to the plaintiffs. 
 
C. The Australian Liquidation and Litigation  
 
KKL went into liquidation in January 1986 in New South 
Wales when it lacked funds to pay its creditors. A liquidator 
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appointed by the Australian courts assumed control and 
discontinued KKL's operations. The liquidator agreed to 
repay $6 million to Wah Kwong as a priority creditor. This 
agreement was incorporated in a confidential settlement 
with various Wah Kwong companies dated May 14, 1986, 
which indicated that Wah Kwong was owed $20 million in 
past-due charterhire and that Wah Kwong was a creditor 
and not a partner. The plaintiffs allege that Wah Kwong 
submitted "show" documents to the liquidator to prove its 
creditor status and persuaded the liquidator to forgo suing 
Wah Kwong in exchange for Wah Kwong's agreement to 
finance certain collateral litigation. Southern Cross and TIP 
were KKL creditors in this liquidation. 
 
In 1994, the liquidator petitioned Justice Bryson of the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales for direction to close 
the proceedings in Australia, because KKL had been wound 
down. Vangsnes and TIP filed an application for leave to 
intervene and argued that Wah Kwong had misrepresented 
itself as a creditor. Justice Bryson rejected this argument, 
finding no evidence of fraud and expressing concerns about 
the statute of limitations, and refused to reopen the 
liquidator's 1986 decision. In 1996, Vangsnes filed an 
application to inspect correspondence and other documents 
in the possession of the liquidator relating to the KKL 
liquidation. An Australian master rejected the application in 
light of Justice Bryson's decision. 
 
D. The New Jersey Bankruptcy Proceeding (The Interpool 
       Litigation) 
 
In early 1986, certain of KKL's U.S. creditors filed 
complaints in the U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey seeking writs of maritime attachment against KKL's 
freights. Three KKL creditors filed a Chapter 7 involuntary 
bankruptcy petition against KKL in the U.S. District Court 
for the Central District of California. All cases were 
consolidated and transferred to the U.S. District Court for 
the District of New Jersey. See Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain 
Freights of M/V Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988), 
appeal dismissed, 878 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1989). Southern 
Cross was a named party in the consolidated action, 
because its assets were attached by KKL's other creditors, 
and TIP was a KKL creditor. 
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In February 1986, the Australian liquidator brought an 
11 U.S.C. S 304(a) proceeding ancillary to a foreign 
proceeding in New Jersey Bankruptcy Court, seeking to 
enjoin the U.S. creditors from proceeding against KKL's 
U.S. assets and to remit those assets to Australia for 
administration in the liquidation there. The S 304 
proceeding was transferred and consolidated with the other 
pending proceedings. The District Court entered an interim 
order enjoining the U.S. creditors from proceeding against 
KKL's assets and later ordered that KKL's freights should 
be distributed among the liquidator and the creditors. In 
February 1988, the liquidator moved to dismiss the 
pending involuntary Chapter 7 petition and thereby 
administer all KKL assets in Australia. On October 14, 
1988, Judge Politan denied the motion and held that KKL's 
U.S. assets should be administered in a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy case. He reasoned that the Australian 
liquidation proceedings (1) were already underway and (2) 
were being conducted ex parte, which under the 
circumstances made it highly unlikely that the rights of 
U.S. creditors would be properly respected. He therefore 
authorized the appointment of a Chapter 7 trustee. 
 
We quote Judge Politan's opinion at length, because it is 
vital to our resolution of this appeal: 
 
       On November 26, 1983, KKL executed a "Heads of 
       Agreement," assuming the business of Karlander. KKL 
       also agreed to pay off Karlander's creditors. In turn, 
       Karlander transferred its rights in the Weyerhauser 
       arbitration to KKL in January 1984. KKL received a 
       loan of $6 million from a Wah Kwong subsidiary, and 
       in exchange, KKL assigned its rights in the 
       Weyerhauser arbitration to Wah Kwong. The repayment 
       method to Wah Kwong for this loan was unclear. 
       According to the Heads of Agreement, it was to be on 
       demand. However, according to a letter dated 
       November 26, 1983, repayment was to be by mutual 
       agreement. Again, on January 11, 1984, a letter was 
       sent to KKL from a Wah Kwong subsidiary, stating that 
       unless outstanding debts exceeded $10,122,000, 
       repayment of the loan would be by mutual agreement. 
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        The relationship between Wah Kwong and KKL was 
       described as a joint venture agreement. Wah Kwong 
       corporate individuals were considered to be partners 
       for the purpose of "earnings or distribution of earnings" 
       of KKL. On March 2, 1984, KKL assigned its earnings 
       to Wah Kwong through another Wah Kwong subsidiary. 
       In addition, by letter dated March 3, 1984, the parties 
       agreed to take care to ensure that "day to day liner 
       service operations will be maintained without any 
       interruption." By agreement, dated October 8, 1984, 
       KKL and Wah Kwong agreed to require joint signatures 
       on all KKL checks. 
 
        In January 1986, a vessel was arrested in L.A., and 
       Wah Kwong issued a press release saying KKL owed[it] 
       $10 million. Wah Kwong blocked payments to creditors 
       who in turn shortened their credit terms and forced a 
       shortage of funds from KKL. Soon after, KKL ceased 
       doing business and Wah Kwong also went into 
       receivership. 
 
        On May 14, 1986, an agreement ("Deed") was 
       consummated between the Liquidator, KKL, Karlander, 
       and several Wah Kwong subsidiaries which concerned 
       the prospective proceeds of the Weyerhauser 
       arbitration pending in San Francisco, California 
       between Karlander and Weyerhauser Co. (Weyco). 
       Karlander had previously assigned its rights in the 
       arbitration outcome on January 10, 1984 to KKL. KKL, 
       in turn, assigned its rights in the arbitration outcome 
       to a Wah Kwong subsidiary, as security for repayment 
       of the $6 million loan. Under the terms of the "Deed," 
       any proceeds from Weyco claims would be paid to the 
       Liquidator. The Liquidator, in turn, agreed to distribute 
       the first $6 million to a Wah Kwong subsidiary in 
       satisfaction of the loan. Following distribution of some 
       other monies, the rest of the proceeds would be held by 
       the Liquidator for the purposes of administering KKL 
       while in bankruptcy. 
 
        A second agreement, dated May 14, 1986, also 
       entitled "Deed", stated that the shipowners had 
       "suffered damages as a result of a breach by KKL of the 
       terms and conditions of its charters." There is a 
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       disagreement as to whether this was true, with KKL 
       asserting that Wah Kwong was in breach by milking it 
       of funds and Wah Kwong asserting that KKL could not 
       meet its obligations and therefore [that Wah Kwong] 
       was entitled to the funds. Both "Deeds" were submitted 
       to the Australian Courts and were approved. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        Since, in this case, the creditors were not notified 
       prior to the date the Court ratified the agreement 
       between the Liquidator and Wah Kwong, and in 
       addition, were not notified of the original S 304 filing, 
       this Court finds that the procedural protections 
       available to creditors in the United States were not 
       given to the United States creditors in Australia. This 
       is a serious omission. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        . . . . Wah Kwong's loan was made payable either on 
       demand or by mutual agreement; Wah Kwong's 
       president sat on the Board of Directors of KKL; and 
       someone from Wah Kwong was required to co-sign 
       checks prior to issuance. Additionally, it was Wah 
       Kwong who allegedly overdrew on monies held by KKL 
       which hampered its ability to pay creditors and led to 
       the involuntary petition being brought against KKL. On 
       its face there appear to be substantial allegations of 
       insider machinations . . . . 
 
        Both the laws and the public policy of the United 
       States will be violated if the case is permitted to 
       proceed under Australian law. The claims of the 
       creditors may have already been prejudiced by the 
       dealings between the Liquidator and Wah Kwong, and 
       this Court does not intend to stand idly by while 
       United States[ ] citizens and creditors are harmed. 
 
Interpool, 102 B.R. at 375-76, 379, 380. 
 
On April 5, 1988, the U.S. bankruptcy trustee entered 
into a settlement with MSI. The settlement included a full 
release by the trustee of KKL's claims against MSI, Wah 
Kwong, and all other Wah Kwong subsidiaries that had 
dealt with KKL. It also included an agreement that MSI 
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would fund prosecution of KKL's arbitration claim against 
the Weyerhauser Company, which the trustee regarded as 
KKL's principal asset. The settlement also recognized MSI 
as a KKL creditor and agreed to share proceeds of the 
Weyerhauser claim. The settlement was approved by the 
District Court. 
 
E. The Illinois Litigation 
 
GLO, which was a shipping agent and a KKL creditor, 
sued Wah Kwong in federal district court in Illinois in 1989. 
GLO, like Southern Cross, is wholly owned by a corporation 
that is at least forty percent owned by Vangsnes. Although 
GLO sought compensation in the liquidation proceedings, it 
was unsuccessful, and it sued Wah Kwong on the theory 
that Wah Kwong entered into a partnership or alter-ego 
relationship with KKL, making it responsible for KKL's 
debts. Wah Kwong once again took the position that it was 
a creditor, not a partner, and that the court therefore 
lacked personal jurisdiction over it. 
 
According to GLO, a partnership existed because Wah 
Kwong had a right to receive a share of KKL's profits, 
agreed to share KKL's losses, and exercised general control 
over KKL. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
affirming the decision of the District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, held that English law applied, which put 
the burden of proof of demonstrating partnership on GLO. 
See Great Lakes Overseas, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping 
Group, Ltd., 990 F.2d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 1993) ("GLO"). The 
court found that the central issue was the characterization 
of Wah Kwong's $6 million payment to KKL. Wah Kwong 
described the transaction as a loan that was part of a 
workout arrangement through which Wah Kwong could 
obtain the charterhire KKL owed it. GLO, on the other 
hand, asserted that the $6 million was not an enforceable 
debt obligation but essentially an equity investment by Wah 
Kwong in a partnership with KKL. 
 
The court in GLO held that the $6 millon was in fact a 
loan, and that the Wah Kwong-KKL relationship was 
therefore a creditor-debtor relationship and not an equity 
arrangement. Although the side letters indicated that the 
money was repayable "on mutual agreement," Wah Kwong 
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was entitled to demand repayment if KKL's liabilities 
exceeded $10.6 million, a situation which in fact developed. 
Moreover, English law recognizes that, under appropriate 
circumstances, transactions may be "loans" even when 
repayment of the loan is only by mutual agreement. See id. 
at 995 n.7. Furthermore, the court found that Wah Kwong 
was not entitled to share in KKL's profits, as a partner 
would be. The close corporate relationship between KKL 
and Wah Kwong, the court concluded, could readily be 
explained as an arrangement by which Wah Kwong could 
attempt to obtain money due on the ships it had chartered 
to KKL, especially in light of the fact that this arrangement 
was recommended by Price Waterhouse as a way to protect 
Wah Kwong's position as a major KKL creditor. See id. at 
996. 
 
The immediate consequence of the decision that Wah 
Kwong was a creditor was that there was no personal 
jurisdiction over Wah Kwong, which could only be haled 
into Illinois courts if it had a partnership or alter-ego 
relationship with KKL. See id. at 998. The plaintiffs here 
contend that the Seventh Circuit misinterpreted the various 
agreements between the parties and relied on certain 
paragraphs that were made ineffective by amendment in 
later agreements, thus erroneously finding a debtor-creditor 
relationship. They also contend that depositions in the GLO 
case revealed important elements of Wah Kwong's 
fraudulent scheme: George and Frank Chao, it is 
contended, admitted that Wah Kwong overdrew on KKL 
earnings to pay themselves charterhire in excess of that to 
which they were entitled under their agreement with KKL, 
while KKL was neither insolvent nor in arrears on 
charterhire payments. The plaintiffs argue that, because 
they were not parties to the Illinois litigation, this evidence 
only became available to them in late 1992 (Southern 
Cross) and mid-1993 (TIP). 
 
F. The Present Dispute 
 
On December 6, 1996, Southern Cross and TIP filed a 
complaint in federal district court in New Jersey alleging a 
fraudulent breach of contract by Wah Kwong and seeking 
damages of $7.2 million. The plaintiffs alleged that, when 
KKL went into liquidation, it owed them substantial sums 
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for services rendered. The plaintiffs' theory was essentially 
that Wah Kwong controlled KKL, looted the company and 
drove it into bankruptcy, and then, adding insult to injury, 
distanced itself from KKL so as to be treated as a preferred 
creditor, rather than a partner responsible for KKL's debts. 
Thus, the plaintiffs are attempting to recover from Wah 
Kwong the money that KKL owed them, along with 
associated damages. 
 
The complaint alleged that Wah Kwong knew that it was 
participating in a partnership that was to share KKL's 
profits and losses. It further alleged that Wah Kwong and 
its principals consistently misrepresented this relationship 
to the Australian liquidator, the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey, the U.S. bankruptcy trustee, the 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. These knowingly 
false representations are said to have enabled Wah Kwong 
to enter into settlement agreements with the liquidator and 
the trustee that resulted in an estate with insufficient funds 
to pay its creditors. Judge Thompson granted Wah Kwong's 
12(b)(6) motion on the ground that the statute of limitations 
had run. 
 
III. The Statute of Limitations 
 
A. The District Court's Opinion 
 
The District Court reasoned that the purported 
misrepresentations occurred prior to January 1986, since 
on the plaintiffs' own allegation it was at that time that the 
Australian liquidator directed that the $6 million loan be 
repaid by KKL. Under New Jersey law, the statute of 
limitations for fraud is six years, see N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 2A:14-1, and a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff 
knows or should know of its existence, see Bougher v. 
University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 80 (3d Cir. 1989). The 
plaintiff must be aware of an injury and a causal 
relationship between the injury and an actor, but need not 
know that the conduct is tortious or legally wrongful. See 
Baird v. American Med. Optics, 713 A.2d 1019, 1026 (N.J. 
1998). When the gist of the action is fraud concealed from 
the plaintiff, the statute begins to run on discovery of the 
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wrong or of facts that reasonably should lead the plaintiff 
to inquire into the fraud. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 2A:14-1; 
Lopez v. Swyer, 300 A.2d 563, 567 (N.J. 1973). 
 
The District Court held that the plaintiffs had notice of 
the alleged misrepresentations at the time they were made 
and that there was no reason to toll the statute. The court 
noted that the Australian liquidator had agreed that Wah 
Kwong was a creditor in the 1986 settlement agreement, 
thus demonstrating that Wah Kwong's position was open 
and notorious. The court also reasoned that Vansgnes was 
involved in the Australian liquidation on behalf of KKL and 
was aware of the arguments Wah Kwong was making to the 
liquidator. 
 
B. The Plaintiffs' Arguments 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the District Court failed to draw 
all reasonable inferences in their favor, as is required when 
there is a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and that it wrongly 
assumed the existence of certain facts not evident on the 
face of the complaint. In this procedural posture, we must 
take all properly pleaded facts as true. See Morse v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). When 
the applicability of the statute of limitations is in dispute, 
there are usually factual questions as to when a plaintiff 
discovered or should have discovered the elements of its 
cause of action, and thus "defendants bear a heavy burden 
in seeking to establish as a matter of law that the 
challenged claims are barred." Van Buskirk v. Carey 
Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481, 498 (3d Cir. 1985). If 
the complaint's allegations, taken as true, allege facts 
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, it must survive a 
motion to dismiss. See Leone v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 599 
F.2d 566, 569 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 
The plaintiffs allege that, though they were aware of Wah 
Kwong's position that it was a creditor and not a partner of 
KKL, they did not have notice that this position was false 
until they obtained documentary evidence in 1992 after 
obtaining discovery documents from the GLO litigation. As 
they point out, as late as 1996, the Australian courts 
refused to allow the Australian creditors (including 
Vansgnes and TIP) access to KKL corporate information and 
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Wah Kwong's dealings with the liquidator. They maintain 
that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 
they had some notice that Wah Kwong's misrepresentation 
was false. 
 
We agree that the mere representation that one is a 
creditor and not a partner, without more, is not suspicious. 
While the District Court characterized Wah Kwong's alleged 
misrepresentation as "open and notorious," it was not 
openly and notoriously a misrepresentation. One would 
have to know other facts, not necessarily within the 
reasonable ken of an unrelated creditor, to know that a 
party that held itself out as a creditor was in fact a partner. 
Thus, the limitations period did not start to run when the 
plaintiffs knew or should have known that Wah Kwong 
represented itself as a creditor. Rather, the period would 
begin to run only when they knew or should have known 
information that would have led a reasonable person to 
question that representation. See Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 
570 F. Supp. 351, 397-98 (D.N.J. 1983), aff 'd without 
opinion, 770 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
In addition, the District Court should not have imputed 
Vansgnes's knowledge to Southern Cross and TIP. First, 
there is nothing in the pleadings or in the published 
decisions of any court that suggests that TIP is in any way 
related to Vansgnes. Second, while Vansgnes's ownership of 
a large amount of Southern Cross stock could potentially 
justify imputing his knowledge to Southern Cross, such an 
imputation could not be made in the context of a 12(b)(6) 
motion. Wah Kwong cites cases concerning shareholder 
derivative suits for the proposition that Vansgnes and 
Southern Cross are in privity, but privity means different 
things in different contexts. 
 
In this case, imputing Vansgnes's knowledge to Southern 
Cross would require resolving issues of fact. Southern 
Cross argues that Vansgnes was not authorized to act for 
it (though he signed the Heads of Agreement on its behalf, 
allegedly as the result of an error) and that he never 
communicated any of the relevant facts to it. It submitted 
an affidavit that Vangsnes was never an officer, employee, 
agent, director, or shareholder of Southern Cross. Another 
sticking point is that the complaint and the published 
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judgments do not reveal that Vansgnes participated in the 
1986 proceedings, which were kept confidential from 
nonparticipants. The parties have not directed our attention 
to the relevant Australian procedures. The Australian 
liquidator took over the management of KKL, and we 
cannot find any suggestion that Vansgnes was involved in 
the Wah Kwong-liquidator settlement negotiations. Possibly 
he was, and if this were a summary judgment motion we 
might have the evidence to prove it, but the District Court 
could not so assume within the 12(b)(6) framework. 
 
If Vansgnes's knowledge in 1986 were dispositive, we 
would be obliged to reverse, as these are issues not 
appropriate for judgment on the pleadings. However, 
Vansgnes was not the only possible source of the plaintiffs' 
knowledge. We turn, therefore, to the 1988 Interpool 
decision. 
 
C. The Importance of Interpool 
 
To resolve a 12(b)(6) motion, a court may properly look at 
public records, including judicial proceedings, in addition 
to the allegations in the complaint. See City of Pittsburgh v. 
West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(public records); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White 
Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(same); Iacaponi v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 379 F.2d 311, 
311-12 (3d Cir. 1967) (previous litigation referred to in 
complaint); In re Woodmar Realty Co., 294 F.2d 785, 788 
(7th Cir. 1961) (previous opinions); DiNicola v. DiPaolo, 945 
F. Supp. 848, 855 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (same); Kithcart v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 62 F. Supp. 93, 94 (W.D. Mo. 
1944) (same), aff'd, 150 F.2d 997 (8th Cir. 1945). 
 
Specifically, on a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial 
notice of another court's opinion--not for the truth of the 
facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, 
which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its 
authenticity. See Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 
774 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 
1582 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Funk v. Commissioner, 163 
F.2d 796, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1947) (whether a court may 
judicially notice other proceedings depends on what the 
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court is asked to notice and on the circumstances of the 
instant case).7 
 
Judge Politan's opinion in Interpool is judicially 
noticeable. Moreover, it is a document on which the 
plaintiffs rely, as they specifically reference it in the 
complaint to show Wah Kwong's fraudulent behavior. We 
may therefore examine the decision to see if it contradicts 
the complaint's legal conclusions or factual claims. See City 
of Pittsburgh, 147 F.3d at 259 (court may examine 
documents of unquestioned authenticity on which the 
plaintiff 's claim depends); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 
F.2d at 1196 (same); Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 
929 F.2d 875, 879 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1991) (rejecting a fraud 
claim in light of the underlying documents, pursuant to a 
12(b)(6) motion). 
 
Our inquiry proceeds in two steps. First, we establish 
that a reasonable creditor who filed a claim in a bankruptcy 
proceeding would examine published opinions in that 
proceeding. Therefore, such a creditor "should have known" 
the contents of a published opinion, for purposes of 
starting the limitations period. Second, we conclude that 
Judge Politan's Interpool opinion contained sufficient 
information to put a reasonable creditor on notice that Wah 
Kwong's claim to be a mere creditor (and not some kind of 
"insider" or partner in the affairs of KKL) was suspicious. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We have held that a court that examines a transcript of a prior 
proceeding to find facts converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for 
summary judgment. See Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274-75 (3d 
Cir. 1970). We do not call Kauffman into question when we hold that 
judicially noticing the existence of a published opinion is proper to 
resolve a 12(b)(6) motion. Recently, courts and commentators have paid 
more attention to the distinction between judicially noticing the 
existence 
of prior proceedings and judicially noticing the truth of facts averred in 
those proceedings. See 21 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, 
Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure: EvidenceS 5106, at 247 (1999 Supp.). 
It has been suggested that the appropriate analogy is the hearsay rule, 
which allows an out-of-court statement to be admitted into evidence for 
purposes other than establishing the truth of the statement. See id.; see 
also Colonial Leasing Co., Inc. v. Logistics Control Group Int'l, 762 F.2d 
454, 459 (5th Cir. 1985) (making the distinction between existence and 
truth). 
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As a result, the plaintiffs, who were creditors in that 
proceeding, should have known the relevant facts about 
Wah Kwong's alleged misrepresentations more than six 
years before the filing of the complaint, and the statute of 
limitations bars this suit. 
 
1. The Obligations of a Bankruptcy Creditor Filing a 
       Claim 
 
The plaintiffs argue that they were not true parties to the 
Interpool litigation, but merely filed their claims in 
bankruptcy court as creditors after receiving notice from 
the U.S. bankruptcy trustee. Interpool actually involved a 
number of consolidated creditors' claims against KKL and a 
distinct S 304 proceeding challenging the propriety of U.S. 
bankruptcy jurisdiction while the Australian liquidation 
was already pending. Though Southern Cross was a named 
party in Interpool, it alleges that it was not involved in 
litigating the S 304 proceeding and participated actively only 
in other aspects of the case involving creditors' claims 
against various freights. 
 
The District Court rejected the plaintiffs' distinction 
between the S 304 proceeding--in which the allegations of 
Wah Kwong's misconduct were made--and the run-of-the- 
mill creditors' claims. It noted that Southern Cross was 
represented by counsel who entered an appearance in the 
litigation, and that TIP, though not a named party,filed a 
claim after receiving notice. According to the District Court, 
Wah Kwong's arguments were put forth in the S 304 aspect 
of the litigation and in Judge Politan's opinion, and the 
plaintiffs neglected their duty of due diligence if they were 
not aware of Wah Kwong's position. While the District 
Court should not have taken "arguments" before Judge 
Politan into account on a 12(b)(6) motion, for the reasons 
that follow we agree that the plaintiffs should have taken 
notice of Judge Politan's opinion explaining the 
appointment of a U.S. bankruptcy trustee despite the 
ongoing Australian litigation. 
 
First, and at the very least, a reasonable creditor should 
have inquired why the court found it necessary to have a 
U.S. proceeding in the face of an ongoing foreign 
liquidation. Although Southern Cross argues that it did not 
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participate in the S 304 aspect of the Interpool case, the 
result that the Australian liquidator sought was to void the 
U.S. attachment of Southern Cross's freights. Southern 
Cross was served with all relevant papers, and the 
contention that it was somehow insulated from theS 304 
proceedings is simply untenable. In these circumstances, 
Southern Cross should have examined Judge Politan's 
opinion resolving the Australian liquidator's S 304 claim. 
 
TIP's obligations as a reasonable creditor are much more 
difficult to determine. Unfortunately, the record of the 
Interpool proceedings has not been preserved in its entirety, 
though there is evidence that, in 1990, the Australian 
liquidator was unable to serve TIP with documents in the 
case because it had moved, and its forwarding order had 
expired. At all events, TIP had notice of the pending U.S. 
bankruptcy proceeding triggered by Judge Politan's opinion, 
because it filed a claim in that proceeding.8 Judge Politan's 
opinion was not simply "notice in the air," as TIP 
participated in the resultant proceedings. See People v. Hill, 
952 P.2d 673, 699-700 (Cal. 1998) (judicially noticing prior 
opinions to show that a prosecutor involved in the prior 
cases had notice of a particular problem). We conclude that 
TIP also should have read Judge Politan's opinion, given the 
circumstances of the case. 
 
2. The Content of the Interpool Opinion 
 
Because a reasonable creditor in the plaintiffs' position 
would have read the opinion, the statute of limitations 
would start to run if the opinion was sufficient as a matter 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The complaint does not specifically allege that TIP filed a claim in 
the 
U.S. bankruptcy proceeding, though it does allege that the plaintiffs were 
unsecured creditors and that "the unsecured United States creditors" 
were harmed by Wah Kwong's representations to the U.S. bankruptcy 
trustee. Logically, only competing claimants could have been harmed by 
Wah Kwong's acts, and thus the only reasonable reading of the 
complaint is that the plaintiffs filed claims. In their brief, the 
plaintiffs 
state that they both filed claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. The brief 
is not evidence, but it allows us to interpret the complaint. See Doe v. 
Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1399 n.13 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Ricciotti v. 
Warwick Sch. Comm., 319 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 n.3 (D.R.I. 1970); 5A 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 1364, at 480-81 (1990). 
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of law to give a creditor notice of the facts underlying the 
fraud claim. We find that the published opinion in Interpool 
was sufficient to put the plaintiffs on notice that there was 
evidence that Wah Kwong was KKL's partner and thus to 
distrust Wah Kwong's representations that it was a mere 
creditor. Cf. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 
Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1548 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
controlling statutory language can be sufficiently clear to 
start a limitations period running as a matter of law). It is 
not relevant whether Judge Politan's interpretation of the 
facts was correct; what is critical is that his interpretation 
was published and available to KKL's creditors, and that 
the discrepancy between Wah Kwong's claims to be a 
creditor and Judge Politan's conclusions was evident on the 
face of the opinion. 
 
Judge Politan described the Wah Kwong-KKL link as 
follows: "The relationship between Wah Kwong and KKL 
was described as a joint venture agreement. Wah Kwong 
corporate individuals were considered to be partners for the 
purpose of `earnings or distribution of earnings' of KKL." 
Interpool, 102 B.R. at 375-76. This adequately disclosed the 
alleged partnership agreement behind the plaintiffs' claims. 
 
Moreover, the opinion repeatedly indicated that Wah 
Kwong might have acted illegitimately. Interpool discussed 
the troubling features of the arrangement between the 
Australian liquidator and Wah Kwong, which the plaintiffs 
now attack as fraudulent. Indeed, Judge Politan was so 
concerned about the fairness of the Australian settlement 
that he appointed a U.S. bankruptcy trustee to administer 
KKL's U.S. assets. Furthermore, the plaintiff 's complaint in 
this case itself demonstrates that the plaintiffs were (or 
should have been) aware of Wah Kwong's position that it 
was a creditor, as both the plaintiffs and the defendant 
were competing creditors in the U.S. bankruptcy 
proceeding. 
 
In sum, the plaintiffs should have been aware of evidence 
of the alleged "true facts" after the 1988 Interpool opinion; 
they were also aware of the allegedly false representation 
during the bankruptcy proceedings. It follows that they 
should have known all the information sufficient to begin 
the running of the statute of limitations, which thus ran on 
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the plaintiffs' fraud claims before the December 6, 1996, 
complaint was filed. The judgment of the District Court will 
be affirmed.9 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Because we find that the statute of limitations has run for both 
plaintiffs, we need not address Wah Kwong's other arguments. 
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